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Plaintiff/Appellant, 
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Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900160 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Statutory jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court because 
this is an appeal from the judgment of a district court over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 (3) (j) ; 78-2a-3 (Supp. 
1990) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was Section 78-14-5 (4) (b) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, improperly construed and applied by the lower court in 
its conclusion of law that the consent executed by Plaintiff's 
wife was proper when Plaintiff was capable of giving such consent 
himself and when Plaintiff had previously refused to execute the 
consent? 
2. Assuming that the lower court's construction of Section 
78-14-5-(4)(b) was proper, is said statute unconstitutional as 
applied in this case in that it denies Plaintiff due process and 
the right to privacy as guaranteed by Article I Sections 7 and 27 
of the Utah Constitution cind Amendment 14, Section 1 and 
fundamental penumbra rights of the United States Constitution? 
3. Did the lower court improperly determine that Section 
78-14-5(1) precluded Plaintiff's cause of action for common law 
battery? 
4. Is Section 78-14-5(1) unconstitutional as applied in 
this case in that it denies Plaintiff a remedy for common law 
battery, denies Plaintiff due process and denies Plaintiff equal 
protection of the law as guaranteed under Article I, Sections 7, 
11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution and Amendment 14, Section 1 of 
the United States Constitution? 
Since all of the above issues prevented for review are based 
upon conclusions of law, the appropriate standard of review is 
that the lower court's conclusion should be accorded no 
particular deference and should be reviewed for correctness. 
Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Further, the order dismissing 
the case was essentially a directed verdict based on proffered 
evidence. Thus, this Court must examine that evidence in a light 
most favorable to Plaintiff and if there is a reasonable basis in 
the evidence, and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom, that 
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would support a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the final order 
of the lower court must be reversed. Management Committee of 
Greystone. Pines Homeowners Assn. v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 6 52 
P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1 U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
All pe 
States, and 
citizens of 
they reside, 
which shall 
citizens of 
deprive any 
without due 
within its 
laws. 
rsons born or naturalized in the United 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
the United States and the State wherein 
No State shall make or enforce any law 
abridge the privileges or immunities of 
the United States; nor shall any State 
person of life, liberty, or property, 
process of law; or deny to any person 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
2. Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
3. Utah Const, art. I, § 11. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
4. Utah Const, art. J, § 24. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
5. Utah Const, art. I, § 27. 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government. 
-* 
6. Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-5 (1987). (Set forth verbatim in 
Addendum [hereinafter "A."] 1-3), 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action for battery against Defendant 
related to back surgery performed by Defendant on Plaintiff on 
May 15, 1987. Plaintiff alleges that such surgery was performed 
without his consent, that the surgery was unsuccessful and, 
therefore, he is entitled to general and special damages for 
Defendant's battery. Complaint, tl 10-12. (R.2). 
Trial of the case commenced on January 29, 1990. A jury was 
duly empanelled and counsel for both pcirties delivered opening 
statements. Before any witnesses were called, the parties 
stipulated that evidence would be submitted by proffer and the 
Court would rule whether such evidence, as proffered and taken in 
a light most favorable to Plaintiff, would support a judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order (hereinafter "Findings" or "Conclusions" or "Order") 1-2. 
(R. 320-21; A. 6-7) . 
Based upon the proffers presented by counsel, the lower 
court determined, as a matter of law, that based upon Section 
78-14-5 of the Utah Code, Defendant was entitled to a directed 
verdict. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case, with 
prejudice. Order at 5. (R. 324; A. 10). 
In support of its order of dismissal, the lower court 
reasoned that a consent executed by Plaintiff's wife, Janet 
Lounsbury, was proper under Section 78-14-5 (4) (b) of the Utah 
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Codef that the consent form signed by Mrs. Lounsbury complied 
with Section 78-14-5 (2) (e) of the Utah Code and, therefore, 
Defendant was authorized as a matter of law to rely upon the 
consent to perform the surgery. Conclusions, 55 2-4. (R. 322; A. 
8) . 
Further, the lower court determined that Plaintiff had 
failed to prove that he suffered any personal injuries arising 
out of the surgery performed by Defendant, that a reasonable 
prudent person in Plaintiff's position would have consented to 
the health care after being fully informed and that the Plaintiff 
had failed to show that the unauthorized surgery was the 
proximate cause of the injuries he complained of in accordance 
with subsections (c) , (f) and (g) of Section 78-14-5(1). 
Conclusions, M 7-8. (R. 323; A. 9). 
The lower court also specifically determined that Plaintiff 
could not recover for mental and emotional damages because such 
damages were unforeseeable to Defendant and therefore, were not 
proximately caused by Defendant's surgery. Finally, the lower 
court stated that because Plaintiff had failed to show that 
Defendant was negligent, and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of Plaintiff's injury, he could not recover. Based on the 
above reasoning, the lower court determined that Plaintiff's 
claim for lack of informed consent failed as a matter of law. 
Conclusions, M 8-10. (R. 323-24; A. 9-10). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff injured his lower back in an industrial accident 
on October 10, 1986. After attempting for several months to 
treat the injury by conservative means, Plaintiff's treating 
physician recommended surgery. Plaintiff sought a second opinion 
from a Dr. David Moore in St. George. Dr. Moore also suggested 
surgery, however, he declined to perform it. (Tr. 46-49). 
Ultimately, on April 22, 1987, Plaintiff visited Defendant 
and was examined in his office. Plaintiff stated some personal 
misgivings and concerns about having surgery but, subsequent to 
the exam, Defendant did recommend surgery. Because of the way 
Defendant conducted the examination and his oveirall attitude, 
Plaintiff continued to have misgivings about the surgery and 
expressed them to Defendant. Nevertheless, a myelogram, which is 
a special x-ray of the back, was scheduled for May 14, 1987, with 
surgery to follow the next morning. (Tr. 49-50). 
At the time Defendants agent, Brent Little, called to 
schedule the myelogram, Plaintiff expressed to Little that he 
would decide to consent to the surgery after the results of the 
myelogram were fully discussed and explained to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff reiterated these same intentions on the morning of May 
14th, immediately prior to the myelogram being performed. (Tr. 
50-51). 
After the myelogram testing was completed by approximately 
noon of May 14, 1990, Plaintiff was admitted to Dixie Medical 
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Center in St. George. At that time a nurse presented Plaintiff 
with a consent form for the surgery contemplated by Defendant. 
Because Plaintiff had not discussed the results of the myelogram 
with Defendant, he refused to execute the consent. Similarly, 
later that afternoon when an anesthetist discussed anesthetic 
procedures with Plaintiff, Plaintiff again refused to execute the 
consent to anesthetic services. (Tr. 51-52). 
Although even later in the afternoon of May 14th Defendant 
did come to the door of Plaintiff's hospital room and state that 
he was going to examine the myelogram results, Defendant never 
returned to Plaintiff's room to discuss and explain the myelogram 
results. (Tr. 52) . 
From approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 14, Plaintiff was given 
Demerol and other medication which made him drousy. The 
following morning at 7:00 a.m., while Plaintiff was under the 
influence of the above medication, plus pre-operative anesthetic 
that was administered at approximately 6:00 a.m., a nurse 
presented Plaintiff's wife, Janet Lounsbury, a sheaf of forms and 
told her to sign them. Mrs. Lounsbury felt intimidated and 
assumed that Defendant had spoken to Plaintiff regarding the 
myelogram results. Therefore, Mrs. Lounsbury executed the 
papers, which included a consent form for the surgery and the 
anesthetic services. Immediately after Mrs. Lounsbury executed 
the forms, Plaintiff was transported to the surgery suite, where 
surgery was ultimately performed on Plaintiff. (Tr. 51-53). (P. 
103, 120; A. 4-5). 
Since the surgery was performedf Plaintiff's physical and 
mental condition have worsened. Testimony from Dr. Reed Fogg, an 
orthopedic surgeon, shows that the surgery was unsuccessful and 
that Plaintiff1s physical condition was considerably worse at the 
time of trial than immediately prior to the surgery. Further, 
testimony from Dr. Daniel P. Sternberg, a physchologist, 
establishes that Plaintiff is now suffering from depression and 
related psychological problems because of the unsuccessful 
surgery. (Tr. 71-75). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Section 78-14-5 {4) (b) should be liberally 
construed in light of subsection (3), which allows any person to 
refuse health care for religious or personal reasons and 
subsection (2) (e) which invalidates a consent obtained without 
legal capacity or by fraudulent omission. Further, based upon a 
liberal interpretation of Section 78-14-5(4), a spouse may 
consent to surgery only in an emergency or when the patient is 
otherwise unable to execute the consent form himself. 
POINT II; Assuming Section 78-14-5 (4) (b) was properly 
construed by the lower court to authorize Plaintiff's spouse to 
consent to surgery upon Plaintiff, said section is 
unconstitutional as applied because it denies to Plaintiff a 
basic liberty and a right to privacy to determine what is done 
with his own body and to be free from bodily invasion, without a 
legitimate state justification or interest to be protected. 
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POINT III: Because Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant did 
not obtain any consent whatsoever, this case does not involve 
failure to obtain informed consent, which, as a term of art, is 
defined as the disclosure of the facts upon which a patient can 
decide whether to submit to health care. Therefore, based upon 
the proper definition of "informed consent", Section 78-14-5(1) 
does not apply in this case and Plaintiff can maintain his cause 
of action for common law battery. Finally, even if Plaintiff 
must prove the elements of Section 78-14-5(1), he has proffered 
sufficient facts to prove a prima facie case under that 
provision. 
POINT IV: Even assuming that the lower court properly 
required Plaintiff to prove the additional elements under Section 
78-14-5(1) and further assuming that Plaintiff cannot make a 
prima facie case under such elements, then Section 78-14-5(1) is 
unconstitutional. First, it denies Plaintiff a remedy for common 
law battery without providing an adequate substitute for it and 
without a reasonable legitimate justification, as prohibited 
under the Open Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Second, the denial of the common law cause of action for battery 
deprives Plaintiff of a cause of action (property) without due 
process of law. Finally, because Section 78-14-5(1) treats 
plaintiffs in battery actions against health care providers 
differently from plaintiffs in other battery actions, and there 
is no rational justification for such distinction, the section is 
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection and uniform 
operation of laws. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 78-14-5(4)(b) OF THE UTAH CODE WAS 
IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED AND APPLIED BY THE LOWER 
COURT IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF'S SPOUSE 
WAS AUTHORIZED TO CONSENT TO SURGERY WHEN 
PLAINTIFF WAS CAPABLE OF GIVING SUCH CONSENT 
HIMSELF AND HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED HIS 
REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO SURGERY 
Based upon its construction of 78-14-5 (4) (b) of the Utah 
Code, the lower court determined that the consent form executed 
by Mrs. Lounsbury was authorized, that it fulfilled the 
requirements of Section 78-14-5(2)(e) and that, therefore, 
Defendant could rely upon the consent and perform the surgery. 
Conclusions, M 2-4. (p. 322; A. 8). In so ruling, the lower 
court has improperly construed Section 78-14-5(4) (b) in light of 
other provisions of the same statute. 
Section 68-3-2 of the Utah Code states that statutes "and 
their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 
(1986). See Houston Real Estate Investment Co. v. Hechler, 
44 Utah 64, 138 P. 1159, 1161 (1914). 
Another general rule of statutory construction is that the 
statute should be considered as a whole and that every provision 
should be considered and given meaning if it is possible to give 
effect to it. Fletcher v. Paige, 124 Mont. 114, 220 P.2d 
484, 486 (1950); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Bean, 167 Or. 535, 
119 P.2d 575, 579 (1941) . 
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In the instant case, the lower court failed to consider two 
provisions in its construction of of Section 78-14-5 and its 
ultimate determination that the consent executed by Mrs. 
Lounsbury was proper. 
Subsection (3) provides that "[n]othing contained in this 
act shall be construed to prevent any person eighteen years of 
age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his own 
person upon personal or religious grounds." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-5(3) (1987). Subsection (2) (e) provides that a written 
consent form, with all of the provisions required by subsection 
(2) (e) , is a defense in an action for failure to obtain consent 
"unless the patient proves that the person giving the consent 
lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and 
convincing proof that the execution of the written consent was 
induced by the defendants affirmative acts of fraudulent 
misrepresentation or fraudulant omission to state material 
facts." Id., Subsection (2) (e) . 
In this case, Plaintiff specifically stated his intention on 
at least two occasions that he would not consent to surgery until 
the doctor had fully explained the results of the myelogram with 
him. In effect, therefore, he was refusing to consent until that 
discussion was completed, which it never was. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff expressly refused to sign consent forms on at least two 
separate occasions when they were presented to him. Under 
subsection (3), Mrs. Lounsbury could not override Plaintifffs 
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refusal to consent by executing the consent form under subsection 
(4)(b) andf therefore, such consent was invalid. 
Because of Plaintiff's repeated refusal, Mrs. Lounsbury 
"lacked capacity to consent" as provided under subsection (2)(e). 
Furthermore, since Defendant never explained the results of the 
myelogram to either Plaintiff or his wife, it may amount to a 
"fraudulent omission to state material facts1', thereby voiding 
any consent form executed by Mrs. Lounsbury. 
Even assuming subsections (2)(e) and (3) do not nullify the 
consent form executed by Mrs. Lounsbury, subsection (4)(b) should 
be liberally construed to apply only when Plaintiff was incapable 
of giving the consent himself. In other words, it must first be 
determined whether Plaintiff can give consent under subsection 
(4) (e) as a "patient eighteen years oi age or over" before 
resorting to obtain consent from his spouse under subsection 
(4)(b). This court seems to apply such a construction in Reiser 
v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
In Reiser, a child and her parents brought a malpractice 
action for damages related to the obstetrical care of Mrs. Reiser 
and the delivery of the child. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, 
that the consent for an amniocentesis, which apparently set off 
the unfortunate chain of events in the case, should have been 
obtained from both parents, not just Mrs. Reiser. The lower 
court determined that consent from only the mother was 
appropriate and this court affirmed, citing Section 78-14-5 (4) (f) 
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for the proposition that "where a married woman is in full 
possession of her faculties, she alone has the power to submit to 
surgical procedures upon herself." Id.. at 99. This court also 
stated: 
It is the settled general rule that in 
the absence of an emergency or unanticipated 
conditions, a physician must first obtain the 
consent of the patient before treating or 
operating on him. The physician must inform 
the patient of all substantial and 
significant risks which might occur; yet he 
need not advise the patient of every 
conceivable risk. 
Id. at 98 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) . 
The sense of Reiser is, then, that the health care provider 
must first go to the patient to obtain consent for a surgical 
procedure. If there is an emergency or other unanticipated 
condition making the patient incapable of giving his consent, 
then, and only then, should the health care provider resort to 
obtaining consent from other persons as provided under subsection 
(4) (b) . Indeed, the consent form itself signed by Mrs. Lounsbury 
apparently recognized this rule. It provides that the signature 
of a representative is " [t]o be used only if the patient is a 
minor or unable to sign." (R. 120; A. 5). 
Defendant will likely contend that the requirements of 
Reiser have been met because, at the time Mrs. Lounsbury signed 
the consent form, Plaintiff was unconscious from preoperative 
medication. Such a contention is improper, however, in the 
context of the elective surgery that was to be performed upon 
Plaintiff. 
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In Eis v. Chestnut, 96 N.M. 45, 627 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App.) , 
cert, denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686 (1981), plaintiff brought 
an action against defendant for medical malpractice and battery, 
claiming that defendant performed a knee operation on the 
plaintiff without plaintiff's consent. Defendant had obtained 
consent for the surgery from plaintiff's daughter on the day 
before the surgery, apparently, because at the time, plaintiff 
was confused. The lower court granted summary judgment for the 
defendant doctor, but the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether proper consent could have been obtained from the 
plaintiff. The court stated that there was no evidence that the 
surgery was performed in an emergency or that plaintiff's 
confusion lasted for such a long period that she could not have 
consented at some other time, while she was not disoriented. 
Id., 627 P.2d at 1247. 
In the instant case, although there is no dispute that 
Plaintiff was unable to sign the consent form at 7:00 a.m. on the 
morning of surgery, this was elective surgery, there was no 
emergency and there is certainly evidence that the^ re were other 
times at which consent could have been obtained, including two 
occasions on the day prior to surgery. Therefore, if subsection 
(4) (b) is construed under the Reiser criteria, then the consent 
form executed by Mrs. Lounsbury was insufficient. 
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POINT II 
SECTION 78-14-5(4)(b), AS APPLIED BY THE 
LOWER COURTf IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A 
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW AND AS AN IMPROPER DEPRIVATION OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Assuming that Section 78-14-5(4)(b) cannot be appropriately-
construed to nullify Mrs. Lounsburyfs consent to the surgery, 
then such provision is unconstitutional as applied in this case 
because it deprives Plaintiff of liberty without due process of 
law as required under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. If 
5 7. Similarly, it deprives Plaintiff of the fundamental right 
to privacy as construed to exist under both Constitutions. See 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); cases 
cited, infra; Utah Const, art. I, § 27. 
As early as 1923, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that liberty encompasses something more than "freedom 
from bodily restraint." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923). There, the Court stated the following definition of 
liberty: 
Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not 
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also 
the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations of 
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his 
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men. 
Id. 
i R 
This Court has similarly defined liberty in McGrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 611 (1938): 
[L] iberty as used in the constitution is the 
right to enjoy to the fullest extent the 
privileges and immunities given or assured by 
law to people living withinin the country and 
under a government which "derives its just 
powers from the consent of the governed," 
subject only to such restrictions as may be 
imposed by law for the benefit of the whole, 
within the limits of a written constitution 
and to a like liberty on the part of the 
other members of the body public. 
The right to consent to health care upon one's own person is 
a liberty as defined above. Indeed, the right to consent to 
surgery may even fit into the strictest definition of liberty: 
"freedom from bodily restraint." Certainly, the surgery 
contemplated here would require confinement to a hospital during 
and after surgery subject to its regulations. In any event, the 
right to consent to or refuse surgery or other health care is 
generally one of the rights "essential to the ordinary pursuit of 
happiness." 
Several courts have recognized a common law right to 
determine what is done with one's own body in terms of health 
care and to be free from invasion of one's own body. See, e.g., 
In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984) 
(individual has right to refuse consent to any medical treatment, 
"based upon a constitutional right of privacy and/or the common 
law right to be free from invasions of one's bodily integrity"); 
Collins v, Itoh, 503 P.2d 36, 40 (Mont. 1972) ("[e]ach man is 
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considered master of his own body and may request or prohibit 
even lifesaving surgery") ; In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 
114, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983) (may refuse life sustaining 
treatment on basis of "common law right to be free from bodily 
invasion") ; Crawford v. Wojnas, 51 Wash. App. 781f 783, 754 P.2d 
1302, 1303 (1988) (informed consent doctrine is "premised on the 
fundamental principal that f[e]very human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body1") (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York 
Hospitals, 213 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)). 
Although, based upon the general definitions and case law 
cited above, the right tc consent to health care appears to be a 
liberty entitled to the protections of substantive due process, 
most, if not all, courts have determined the constitutionality of 
laws that restrict the right to consent to health care on the 
basis that such a right of consent flows from the fundamental 
right to privacy. 
No court has directly determined the constitutionality of 
Section 78-14-4(b) or a similar statute. Nevertheless, because 
the right to consent or refuse health care is at least a 
fundamental common law right, the analysis adopted by courts in 
the "right to privacy" cases is applicable here. 
No analysis of the right to privacy should be considered 
without a discussion of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). There, 
a woman brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
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on the basis that Texas criminal laws prohibiting abortion were 
unconstitutional. A three-judge panel of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined the 
abortion laws were unconstitutional and the case was appealed 
directly to the United States Supreme Court. The Court affirmed, 
holding that it was unconstitutional to prohibit abortions at all 
stages of pregnancy. Id. at 165-66. 
The Roe v. Wade Court reasoned that there was a 
constitutional right of privacy founded upon the concept of 
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment and determined that such 
right includes a right to an abortion. Ld. at 153-54 (citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra) . The Court then concluded that a 
deprivation of the right of privacy (to have an abortion) could 
only be justified when outweighed by substantial state interests. 
Id. Because the Court determined that there was not a 
sufficient, justifiable state interest to prohibit abortions 
under any circumstances, it determined the Texas abortion laws to 
be an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to privacy. 
Further, to pass constitutional muster, the Court held that a 
statute must be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state 
interests. Id.. 155-56. See also People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 
954, 458 P.2d 194, 199-201 (1969). 
The United States Supreme Court has also held that it is an 
unconstitutional deprivation of the right to privacy to require 
that a spouse consent to an abortion before it is performed. 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 68-71 (1976). 
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In this case there is no legitimate state interest in 
allowing a spouse to consent to surgery under all circumstances. 
The only conceivable legitimate purpose for such a provision-
would be if the patient was unable to consent himself either 
because of incompetence or an emergency situation. Unfortu-
2 
nately, Section 78-14-5 (4) (b) is not so narrowly drawn. 
Therefore, as in Roe v. Wadey that statute is unconstitutional as 
applied in this case. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has apparently 
limited the effect of Roe v. Wade in Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) , it did not derogate the 
fundamental right to privacy and the analysis in Roe v. Wade 
remains the same. Further, the state interest advanced in both 
Roe v. Wade and Webster, is the desire to protect a fetus and 
further the reproduction of life. That justification is 
inapplicable in this case because Plaintiff's determination 
whether to consent to elective surgery has no direct effect upon 
anyone else's life, only his own. 
Another line of cases applying due process standards to the 
right of privacy are those involving the decision to terminate 
Conceivably, if a spouse could consent under all circumstances 
he/she could consent to a surgical procedure for a patient, such 
as sterilization, despite the patient's religious or personal 
objections to such a procedure. 
2 Of course, nothing precludes this court from determining that 
the legislature intended subsection (4) (b) to be so interpreted 
and construed. 
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life sustaining procedures for terminally ill or "brain dead" 
patients. The seminal case on this issue is In re Quinlany 70 
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). There, a father sought to be 
appointed guardian of his daughter so that he could direct and 
authorize the discontinuance of life sustaining procedures for 
the comatose daughter. The lower court denied both the 
guardianship and the authorization to terminate the life 
supporting equipment. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined 
that the father could make the decision to terminate the life 
supporting systems on behalf of his daughter if the attending 
physician determined that there was no reasonable possibility of 
the daughter ever recovering. 
In its holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that 
there was a constitutional right to privacy "broad enough to 
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under 
certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough 
to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under 
certain conditions." 3x1. , 355 A. 2d at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 
supra) . Again, as in Roe v. Wade, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
weighed the right of privacy against the interests of the state 
in the preservation of human life and determined that, after 
certain safeguards were met, the right to determine what is done 
with one's body is paramount over the state's interests. See 
also, In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738, 
742-44 (1983) . 
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The California Court of Appeals has carried the 
Quinlan/Colyer rule one step further in Bartling v. Superior 
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984). There, a 
patient himself sought to terminate treatment for a condition 
that, although probably incurable, was not diagnosed as terminal. 
The lower court denied an injunction requiring the hospital to 
disconnect a respirator but the California Court of Appeals 
remanded, holding that the patient had the right to order the 
disconnection of the equipment. Again, after weighing the 
state's interest of preservation of life, protecting innocent 
third parties, preventing suicide and protecting professional 
ethics, against the right to exercise control over one's own 
body, the California Court of Appeals determined that the latter 
interest was paramount. The court stated that " fa person of 
adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of 
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit 
to lawful medical treatment•'" Id. at 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 
224 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9 
(1972)) . 
In this case, Plaintiff did not need the surgery to preserve 
his life. Further, the surgery was entirely elective. Indeed, 
Plaintiff had spent considerable time obtaining second and third 
opinions to determine whether surgery was warranted. Plaintiff 
had no incurable or terminal illness making the surgery necessary 
to preserve his life. Accordingly, the state's interest in this 
case, if anyf is substantially less significant than in Quinlany 
Colyer or Bartlingy all of which determined that the state's 
interests were outweighed by the right to consent or refuse 
medical treatment. Accordingly, as In Quinlan, Colyer and 
Bartling, Section 78-14-5 (4) (b) is an unconstitutional 
deprivation of the rights of personal liberty, privacy and other 
applicable fundamental rights. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED SECTION 
78-14-5(1) TO PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR COMMON LAW BATTERY 
The lower court determined that Plaintiff had failed to meet 
at least three of the requirements to maintain a cause of action 
against Defendant under Section 78-14-5(1) of the Utah Code. 
That subsection provides that to maintain an action for failure 
to obtain informed consent, he must show that he "suffered 
personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered", that 
he "would not have consented to the hecilth care rendered" after 
being fully informed of the facts and that "the unauthorized part 
of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of the 
personal injuries suffered" by him. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-5(1) (c) , (f) , (g) (1987) . 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges a cause of action for common 
law battery based upon Defendant's failure to obtain any consent 
for the surgery. Assuming it is applicable to Plaintiff's 
action, Section 78-14-5(1) requires that Plaintiff prove more 
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than he ordinarily would be required to prove in order to 
maintain a cause of action for common law battery. 
As a general rule, in an action for common law battery, a 
plaintiff need not necessarily show that he sustained personal 
injury. Neither is proximate cause an element of a common law 
cause of action for battery. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Battery §§ 
5, 111, 178, 180 (1963). The New Mexico Court of Appeals applied 
this general rule in Eis v. Chestnut, 96 N.M. 45, 627 P.2d 1244 
(Ct. App.), cert, denied, 628 P.2d 686 (1981), and stated the 
following with a regard to a battery similar to the one here: 
A physician who operates without the 
patient's consent commits a battery . . . . 
In a suit against a surgeon for battery there 
is no need that the patient be physically 
damaged by the surgery. Consequently, there 
is no need for expert medical testimony to 
show either causation or standard of care. 
The only question to be determined is whether 
the patient consented to the specific 
operation performed. 
Id. at 1246 (citations omitted). 
Assuming that Plaintiff need not meet the criteria set forth 
in Section 78-14-5(1), by construing the facts of the case in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff can certainly make 
out a prima facie case for common law battery. And, based upon 
rules of construction, the requirements of subsection (1) should 
not apply in this case. 
?-} 
Section 68-3-11 of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
Words and phrases are to be construed 
according to the context and the approved 
usage of the language; but technical words 
and phrases, and such others as have acquired 
a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or 
are defined by statute, are to be construed 
according to such peculiar and appropriate 
meaning or definition, 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1986). 
Section 78-14-5(1) provides that the subject criteria must 
be met "in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain 
informed consent." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-5(1) (emphasis added). 
Since "informed consent" is a term of art having a "peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law" Section 78-14-5(1) must be construed 
according to the peculiar definition of informed consent. 
Black1s Law Dictionary defines "informed consent" as 
follows: 
A person1s agreement to allow something to 
happen (such as surgery) that is based on a 
full disclosure of facts needed to make the 
decision intelligently; i.e. , knowledge of 
risks involved, a]ternatives, etc. Informed 
consent is the name for a general principle 
of law that a physician has a duty to 
disclose what a reasonably prudent physician 
in the medical community in the exercise of 
reasonable care would disclose to his patient 
as to whatever grave risks of injury might be 
incurred from a proposed course of treatment, 
so that a patient, exercising ordinary care 
for his own welfare, and faced with a choice 
of undergoing the proposed treatment, or 
alternative treatment, or none at all, may 
intelligently exercise his judgment by 
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reasonably balancing the probable risks 
againsts against the probable benefits. 
Black1s Law Dictionary 701 (5th ed. 1979) (citing ZeBarth v, 
Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1, 8 
(1972)) . 
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did 
not make any disclosures of the facts he felt were needed in 
order to decide whether to submit to surgery. Plaintiff simply 
alleges that Defendant did not obtain any consent whatsoever to 
perform the surgery. Consequently, the wrongful acts that 
Plaintiff alleges do not fall within the definition of "informed 
consent" as the term is used in Section 78-14-5(1), and he need 
not prove the elements outlined in that subsection. 
At least two courts have recognized a distinction between an 
action based upon failure to obtain informed consent and an 
action for failure to obtain any consent whatsoever, namely 
battery. In Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1 (1972), 
the California Supreme Court explained the difference between a 
duty to provide informed consent and the failure to obtain any 
consent whatsoever: 
The battery theory should be reserved for 
those circumstances when a doctor performs an 
operation to which the plaintiff has not 
consented. . . . However, when the patient 
consents to the certain treatment and the 
doctor performs that treatment but an 
undisclosed inherent complication with a low 
probability occurs, no intentional deviation 
from the consent given appears; rather, the 
doctor in obtaining consent may have failed 
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to meet his care duty to disclose pertinent 
information* In that situation the action 
should be pleaded in negligence. 
Id. , 502 P.2d at 8. See also Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 
272, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974). 
In the instant case, the elements that a patient must prove 
in order to maintain an action for lack of informed consent are 
essentially elements of negligence, which is appropriate, based 
upon the distinct duty established in Cobbs and Miller. 
Conversely, based upon Cobbs and Miller, since the Plaintiff in 
this case has alleged, and can prove, that Defendant obtained no 
consent whatsoever for the surgery performed, he need only prove 
the elements of battery and not the negligence elements of 
Section 78-14-5(1). 
Even assuming that Plaintiff must establish the elements of 
Section 78-14-5(1) in order to maintain this action, the 
evidence, when considered in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, 
establishes that he has met the elements that the lower court 
found lacking. 
Plaintiff has demonstrated that he has suffered personal 
injuries as a result of the unsuccessful surgery. Both Dr. Fogg 
and Dr. Sternberg have testified that Plaintiff's physical and 
mental condition have worsened since the unsuccessful surgery. 
Furthermore, Dr. Sternberg has testified that the emotional and 
mental injuries that Plaintiff has suffered were caused by the 
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unsuccessful surgery. Finally, because cf Plaintiff's 
apprehensions about Dr. Capel in general, it is not conclusively 
established, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff would have 
consented to the surgery even if Dr. Capel had shown Plaintiff 
that the myelogram results dictated surgery. Accordingly, 
regardless of the Court's construction of Section 78-14-5(1), 
Plaintiff has made a prama facie case for battery and/or 
negligence. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 78-14-5(1), AS APPLIED BY THE LOWER 
COURT, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DEMIES 
PLAINTIFF A REMEDY FOR COMMON LAW BATTERY, 
DEPRIVES PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS AND DENIES 
PLAINTIFF OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNIFORM 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
Even assuming that the lower court properly construed 
Section 78-14-5(1) to require Plaintiff to prove additional 
€ilements in order to maintain his cause of action, such a 
construction, as applied in this case, unconstitutionally denies 
Plaintiff his right to a common law action for battery under the 
Open Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. 
I, § 11. Moreover, the effective abrogation of Plaintiff's claim 
for common law battery denies him substantive due process 
guaranteed under both the Federal and State Constitutions. U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Finally, 
because there is no justifiable basis for denying Plaintiff an 
action for common law battery in this case, while preserving such 
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a right in all other situations, Plaintiff has been denied equal 
protection and uniform application of the laws as required under 
both the Federal and State Constitutions, U.S. Const, amend. 
XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 24. 
A. Open Courts 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution declares that 
"[a]11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law . . . ." Utah Const, art. I, § 11. 
Although this court has never addressed the constitutionality of 
Section 78-14-5(1) under Article I, Section 11, it has set forth 
criteria for analyzing the constitutionality of laws under the 
Open Courts Provision in several recent cases testing the 
constitutionality of statutes of repose. 
In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 19 85) , plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful death 
against the manufacturer of an airplane under products liability 
theories for defects in the airplane that caused the death of 
their husband and father. The lower court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant manufacturer of the airplane on the 
grounds that the action was barred under a products liability 
statute of repose providing that such an action cannot be brought 
for more than six years after the product is initially purchased 
or ten years after its date of manufacture. This court reversed 
the summary judgment and remanded the matter to the lower court 
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for trial, holding that the products liability statute of repose 
was unconstitutional under the Open Courts Provision. The court 
established a two-part analysis for determining whether a 
provision is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Provision: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law 
provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course 
of law" for vindication of his constitutional 
interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in 
value or other benefit to the remedy 
abrogated in providing essentially comparable 
substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation, although the form of 
the substitute remedy may be different. . . . 
Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of 
the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy is 
not an arbitrary on unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective. 
Id. at 680 (citations and footnote omitted). 
This court has adopted the Berry test in subsequent cases 
involving the builders and architects statute of repose. See 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1094 (Utah 1989); 
Sun Valley Waterbeds v Herm Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188, 191-92 
(Utah 1989) . 
Under the first part of the analysis, it appears that the 
substitute remedy contemplated would be something similar to the 
worker's compensation and no fault insurance provisions. Berry, 
717 P.2d at 677. In this case, there is no alternative statutory 
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remedy like worker's compensation or no fault insurance that 
would compensate a person for a nonconsensual surgery. 
Defendant will likely argue that the legislature has 
established a remedy for failure to obtain consent under Section 
78-14-5(1). However, as discussed below, that remedy is wholly 
inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for an unwanted invasion 
of his body when the surgery may have been successful. The 
substitute is not substantially equal to the one at common law. 
The second prong of the Berry analysis is whether there is 
any reasonable or justifiable legislative purpose behind the 
statute in question. The stated objective of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, which includes Section 78-14-5, is to 
reduce malpractice premiums and insure the availability of 
malpractice insurance, thereby making health care more available 
to the public in general. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1987). That 
justification is simply not appropriate under the facts of this 
case. 
First, insurers, including malpractice insurers, rarely 
provide coverage for intentional torts such as assault and 
battery. Even if an insurance policy did somehow insure against 
intentional torts, it would likely be void as against public 
policy because it would encourage intentional, even criminal, 
injury against persons. Accordingly, allowing an action for 
common law battery would have no effect whatsoever on the stated 
policy of reducing and making available malpractice insurance. 
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Second, an action for common law battery would derogate 
another state interest in regulating the wrongful and improper 
conduct of physicians. By abrogating the action for common law 
battery, the legislature is, in effect, saying to physicians: 
"You may perform surgeries without consent and will not be 
liable, as long as you do not cause any personal injury to the 
patient and as long as you can show that the patient would have 
consented anyway if you had asked him." Certainly, the 
legislature did not intend to give physicians such a free hand. 
Because there is no justifiable legislative purpose behind 
abrogation of an action for common law battery, Section 
78-14-5(1) cannot, constitutionally, be applied to prevent 
Plaintiff1s claim in this case. 
B. Due Prccess 
In Berry, this court stated as follows: 
To a degree, the open courts provision 
is an extension of the due process clause. 
Indeed, the open courts provision and the due 
process clause also have an overlapping 
function, to some extent, with respect to the 
abrogation of causes of action. If the 
Legislature were to abolish all causes of 
action for injuries to one's person or 
property caused by defective products and 
provide no substitute equivalent remedy, we 
have little doubt that it would violate 
Section 11, and perhaps even the due process 
clause of Article I, Section 7. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 679, quoted in, Condemarin v. University 
Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 357 (Utah 19 89) (Durham, J., lead 
opinion). 
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It appears that the criteria for determining whether 
abrogation of the cause of action for common law battery is a 
denial of substantive due process is virtually identical to the 
criteria under the Open Courts Provision as set forth in Berry, 
Consequently, Plaintiff has addressed the due process analysis 
only briefly. 
A few courts have determined that laws denying causes of 
action constitute a deprivation of property without due process 
of law and, therefore, are unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 
(1930)(judgment denying relief from discrimination for failure to 
first seek an administrative remedy is an unconstitutional 
deprivation of property without due process); Morris v. Gross, 
572 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tenn. 1978) (vested rights of action are 
property which cannot be deprived without due process of law) ; 
Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1040, 
1045 (1931) (repeal of statute would be unconstitutional 
deprivation of property without due process of law for rights 
under statute that have vested prior to repeal). 
C. Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Laws 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that 
!t[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1. 
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This court has recently construed the application of both of 
the above provisions in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
There, this court struck down as unconstitutional the Utah 
Automobile Guest Statute. This court established the following 
criteria for determining whether a provision is an 
unconstitutional denial of equal protection: 
Article I, § 24 protects against two 
types of discrimination. First, a law must 
apply equally to all persons within a class. 
Second, the statutory classifications and the 
different treatment given the classes must be 
based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. If the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is 
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrinination 
is unreasonable. 
When persons are similarly situated, it 
is unconstitutional to single out one person 
or a group of persons from among a larger 
class on the basis of a tenuous justification 
that has little or no merit. 
Id. at 670-71 (citations omitted) . Accord, Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889-90 (Utah 
1988). 
In this case, it would appear that Section 78-14-5(1) is not 
unconstitutional under the first criteria established in Malan. 
All plaintiffs who have brought an action for common law battery 
against a health care provider are treated the same and all 
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plaintiffs who have brought an action for common law battery 
against other defendants are treated the* same. In other words, 
it is the type of defendant, whether a health care provider or 
otherwise, that determines the class into which a particular 
plaintiff falls. Consequently, under the second criteria 
established in Malan, in ord€>r for the abrogation of an action 
for common law battery to pass constitutional muster, there must 
be some reasonable legislative justification and objective that 
is fulfilled by the classification. Indeed, it appears that the 
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analysis is essentially the scime as in Berry. 
For the same reasons stated in the analysis of the Open 
Courts Provision, above, any justification or rationale offered 
for applying Section 78-14-5(1), to depiive Plaintiff of a cause 
of action for common law battery, is irrational, tenuous and not 
justified. Therefore, such an application amounts to a denial of 
equal protection and/or uniform operation of laws. 
In Condemarin, two justices in the majority expressed some 
dissatisfaction in using the* equal protection analysis rather 
than a due process analysis (or open courts analysis) for 
determining the constitutionality of a governmentally immunity 
provision, Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357-60 (Durham, J., lead 
opinion), 366-68 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part). On the 
other hand, the third justice concurring in the majority and both 
dissenting justices believed the equal protection approach to be 
the more appropriate. 3^3.. at 369-70 (Stewart, J., separate 
opinion), 378-380 (Hall, C.J., dissenting). Because of this 
apparent divergence in the court, Plaintiff has presented for 
review analyses under both approaches. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse 
the lower court's directed verdict and order of dismissal and 
remand the case to the lower court for trial before the trier of 
fact. 
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ADDENDUM 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof re-
quired of patient— Defenses — Consent to health 
care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care pro-
vider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did was ei ther 
expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages 
from a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to 
obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the pat ient 
and health care provider; and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the heal th care 
rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and signifi-
cant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk; 
and 
(0 a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not 
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully in-
formed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In determin-
ing what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do 
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the 
patient before health care was provided and before the occurrence of any 
personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proxi-
mate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient. 
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care 
ovider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if: 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was 
relatively minor; or 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider 
was commonly known to the public; or 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of, 
tha t he would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or 
that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be 
entitled to be informed; or 
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts 
and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and ex-
tent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably 
believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substan-
tial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which 
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which 
contains a declaration tha t the patient accepts the risk of substantial and 
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of 
health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved 
have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfac-
tory niaiiiici .snd that all questions asked about ih<j health care and n> 
attendant risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the pa-
tient or his representative; such written consent bhall be a defense to an 
action against a health care provider based upon failure to obtain in-
formed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the con-
sent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing proof 
that the execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's 
affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission 
to state material facts. 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent any person 
ghteen years of age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his 
vn person upon personal or religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any 
;alth care not prohibited by law: 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a spouse; 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally 
serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for his 
ward; 
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for his or her parent who is 
unable by reason of age, physical or mental condition, to provide such 
consent; 
(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over; 
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in con-
nection with her pregnancy or childbirth; 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother or sister; 
and 
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grand-
child. 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes heal th care t reat -
ment or procedures for another as provided by this act shall be subject to civil 
liability. 
loj/o / g o 
DIXIE M E D I A L CENTER 
544 South 400 East • (801) 673-9681 
St. George, Utah 84770 
PREOPERATIVE INFORMATION 
Have you had: 
Heart trouble 
Asthma 
Epilepsy 
Jaundice 
Kidney disease 
Other illnesses 
3ack trouble 
Bleeding tendency 
^oJiKj^^- Allergies 
- . False teeth or loose teeth 
( I I I Caps or bridges 
Abnormal chest x-ray 
Abnormal ECG 
Age 
Present weight 
Height 
Do you have any problems 
Have you had: 
Broken bones of face 
Broken bones of neck or back 
Previous anesthesia 
Bad reaction to anesthesia 
Relatives with bad reactions 
to anesthesia 
Do You: 
Take medicine or drugs 
Wear contact lenses 
Drink Alcohol 
Are you pregnant 
L+J^L 
Jr^s> No 3 
_Ye^) No h^-xi^L-^ 
j f e s ^ N o 
Yes ffto^J^<^> j
 w Q /f*< 
Yes ( N o 
< ^ > N o 
Yes No 
Smoke / c 2 . ^ 2 ^ / c V \ ^ o . (^Ye£> 
to discuss with anesthesia? 
YesJ No 
Yes ( N o ^ 
Yes (>Jg» 
Yes (No 
I understand that there can be comolicatlons with any anesthetic and those complications have been 
discussed with me. 
Patient's Signature 
C.N.S. 
C.V.S. 
t/ as. f^/^r-A^ • 3J 
Other y 
Lab results 
For: 
P.S L 
© 
NOTES: 
SAB 
.Complicat ions explained. 
Epidural 
if. 
Local 
._ Risk accepted . H*-. 
0 
L / \) Ac>r>YTW^^ c^  h^^^^^J^^ n/j^ * 
/ (Anesthesia) 
Form No. 4 0 4 - 4 R#v. 1/84 1C3 
DIXIE MEDICAL CENTER 
544 South 400 East, St. George. Utah 84770. 801-673-9681 
CONSENT TO OPERATION, ANESTHETICS, 
AND OTHER MEDICAL SERVICES 
I authorize and request the performance upon 
(patient name) ' 
of the following operation: JU^^-c^y-y^pr€ ^ - r ^ o o <r\ r\c\ 
o o ^ -S;^^N L |^ - ^ QV 1.5-"S> 
to be performed by Dr. Q OxJ^  V a P ^ w i t h a n y a s s o c i a c e s °r 
assistants of his/her choice^ 0 
I acknowledge that my physician(s) has explained my condition, the nature and purpose 
of the proposed health care or surgical procedure, as well as alternative treatment(s), 
and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant risks have been 
answered in a satisfactory manner. I hereby accept the risk of substantial and serious 
harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of the health care. 
I also understand that the proposed care may involve possibilities of complications and 
that certain complications have been know to occur following the procedure to which 
I am consenting even when the utmost care , judgement and skill are used. I understand 
that there have been no guarantees made to me as to the results of the surgical procedure. 
I recognize that during the course of the procedure unforeseen conditions may require 
additional or different procedures than those explained. 1, therefore, authorize and request 
that my physician and any associates or assistants of his/her choice perform such proce-
dures as, in their professional judgement, are necessary and desirable for my well-being. 
1 further consent to the administration of such anesthesia as may be necessary or appro-
priate for such procedure. 
I further consent to the examination of any tissues or parts which may be removed from 
my body by the hospital authorities, and further consent to the disposal of such tissues 
and parts by hospital authorities. 
For purposes of advancing medical education, I consent to the admittance of medical 
personnel to the operating room. 
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS DOCUMENT AND AUTHORIZE AND ACCEPT 
THE PROPOSED CARE REGARDLESS OF THE RISK. 
/Dat£ Time / Patient's Signature ~V 
Witness ^ Relationship to Patient 
(To be usetf only if patient is a minor 
or unable to sign) 
Approved Surgery Committee: 12/86 O O f l*^Q 
';;:;;TV 
'30 PlfiH 22 Hi1! 8 25 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHEL LOUNSBURY, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 89-2550 
NEAL C. CAPEL, M.D., Judge J. Philip Eves 
Defendant. 
This action came on regularly for jury trial on January 29, 
1990, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable J. Philip 
Eves presiding. The plaintiff appeared personally and by and 
through his counsel, Floyd W. Holm, Esq. of Chamberlain & Higbee, 
and defendant appeared personally and by and through his counsel, 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. and Elizabeth King Brennan, Esq. of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau. The parties selected a jury and 
presented opening statements. 
After the parties1 opening statements, the parties 
stipulated that plaintiff could present a proffer of evidence 
which the Court could then rely upon to determine whether a 
sufficient factual and legal basis had been shown to submit the 
case to the jury. Plaintiff, through his counsel, presented a 
proffer on the record of evidence he anticipated his witnesses 
would offer should they be called to testify. At the conclusion 
of the proffer, defendant made a Motion to Dismiss based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence presented in light of the statutory 
requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-1, et 
seg., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
The Court now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff, Michel Lounsbury was injured in an 
industrial accident on October 10, 1986. 
2. Plaintiff was admitted to Dixie Medical Hospital for 
surgery on May 14, 1987. 
3. On the morning of surgery, a consent form authorizing 
surgery was signed by plaintiff's wife. 
4. The surgical consent form authorized surgery by Dr. 
Capel for Michel Lounsbury. 
5. The surgery authorized was the surgery performed by Dr. 
Capel. 
6. There is no evidence of fraudulent concealment or 
fraudulent omission to state material facts on the part of Dr. 
Capel. 
-2-
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This action is a medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider which is governed by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, §78-14-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). 
2. Mrs. Lounsbury was authorized and empowered by the 
provisions of Section 78-14-5(4)(b) to consent to health care 
rendered to her husband. 
3. The consent form the plaintiff's spouse, Janet 
Lounsbury, signed on her husband1 s behalf complied with the 
provisions of Section 78-14-5 (2) (e) , Utah Code Ann,, (1953, as 
amended). 
4. Dr. Capel was authorized as a matter of law to rely on 
said consent in performing the surgery. 
5. When a person submits to health care rendered by a 
health care provider, it is presumed that what the health care 
provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be 
done. Section 78-14-5(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
6. The consent form executed by the plaintiff's spouse 
provides a complete defense to plaintiff's claim of alleged 
failure to obtain his consent to the surgery. 
-3-
7. Plaintiff also failed as a matter of law to establish 
the other elements of a claim for lack of informed consent as 
outlined in Section 78-14-5(1), Subsections (a) through (g) . To 
prevail on a claim for lack of informed consent, plaintiff must 
establish each and every element of said section. However, in 
this case plaintiff offered no evidence that he suffered personal 
injuries arising out of the health care rendered, as required by 
subsection (c); nor that a reasonable prudent person in the 
patientfs position would not have consented to the health care 
rendered after having been fully informed as to all the facts 
relevant to the decision to give consent as required by 
subsection (f); nor that the unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by 
the plaintiff, as required by subsection (g). 
8. Further, by failing to produce evidence of physical 
damages which were proximately caused by Dr. Capelfs conduct, 
plaintiff's claim for lack of informed consent fails as a matter 
of law. 
9. In a negligence action against a health care 
professional, plaintiff must establish, usually through expert 
testimony, that the defendants conduct deviated from recognized 
and accepted standards and that said conduct was a proximate 
cause of the damages as alleged by the plaintiff. Based on 
plaintiff's proffer, the court finds as a matter of law that the 
-4-
evidence does not establish negligence on the part of the 
defendant, nor that defendants conduct proximately caused 
physical damages, 
10. The plaintiff in this medical malpractice action cannot 
recover for emotional or psychological damages because there is 
no evidence establishing proximate causation. Thus, defendant 
Dr. Capel can not be held accountable for unforeseeable 
psychological consequences of his surgery, whether it be 
successful or unsuccessful. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as well as on the Stipulation and evidence proffered by the 
parties, the court grants the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and 
orders that plaintiff's Complaint be, and the same is hereby, 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this P-/- day of March, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Phi l ip E.ves 
l i s t r i c t Court Judge 
12\EK8\1022<*.593\Findings 
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